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INTRODUCTION
The importance of intraday markets for electricity is increasing constantly in Germany as the need for short term adjustments of conventional energy production due to intermittent generation of renewable energy sources (RES) is raising as Bueno-Lorenzo et al. (2013) stress. In 2012, the installed capacity of intermittent RES amounted to 29 GW wind power and to 25 GW solar power which was more than 30 % of the total installed production capacity. The intermittency of wind and solar power leads to so called forecast errors at the marketing process of RES. The forecast errors correspond to the deviation between the day-ahead planned and marketed and the actually realized electricity production. The forecast error of RES may be traded together with other imbalances like unplanned power plant outages and the load forecast error in the intraday market. Scharff and Amelin (2011) notice that the intraday market enhances system security by relieving the balancing mechanism.
1 Furthermore all market participants have a monetary interest to correct imbalances on intraday markets because this costs less than purchasing power on the balancing market.
The research target of this paper is to explain liquidity in the German intraday market for electricity (GIME) from 2010 to 2011. According to Sarr and Lybek (2002) liquidity in any market is generally perceived as desirable because it increases allocation and information efficiency. Two models of liquidity are developed. The first model explains the liquidity provision from a fundamental perspective, where only power plant owners with available and flexible power plant capacities offer liquidity while risk-averse impatient traders with intraday imbalances trade against the power plant owners and consume the offered liquidity. In the second model, impatient traders are assumed to be risk neutral and try to increase their revenues with trading strategies including the provision of liquidity to the market in form of limit orders.
Despite its importance for optimization purposes and system security, research about liquidity in the GIME and similar continental European intraday markets is scarce. Weber (2010) stresses the importance of the functioning of the day-ahead and intraday markets to integrate wind energy. For the year 2007, he identifies a low intraday liquidity in terms of trading volume and recommends the adaption of the Spanish intraday market design in order to increase liquidity in the GIME. Borggrefe and Neuhoff (2011) analyze the intraday market as a viable option to decrease balancing costs which are part of the overall wind integration costs in Germany. Furio et al. (2009) focus on the Spanish intraday market liquidity and assess the liquidity risk which could discourage agents to participate in the intraday market. Because in contrast to the GIME, the Spanish intraday market is auction based, their research methods and results are not directly applicable to the GIME.
This paper intends to contribute to the present literature in several ways. First of all the development and empirical falsification of the fundamental and the trading model of liquidity may be the first theoretical approach to the analysis of liquidity in the GIME. Secondly the empirical analysis of commonly used indicators of liquidity like the bid ask-spread, resiliency, market depth, price volatility and trading volume in the GIME has not been undertaken so far.
Moreover the theoretical soundness of the commonly used liquidity indicators is scrutinized for the case of intraday markets for electricity.
The paper is organized as follows. In the second chapter, the German short term electricity market design is reviewed. In chapter three, the commonly used dimensions of liquidity are identified based on the existing literature. Afterwards, the fundamental and the trading model of intraday liquidity are developed. Theoretical research hypotheses about the relations between the indicators of liquidity, intraday deviations from the day-ahead planning and the merit order are then worked out. Chapter three ends with an overview of the intraday deviations from the day-ahead planning that the market participants may trade in the GIME and that are used as explanatory variables in the empirical analysis. Chapter four gives an overview of the data used in the empirical analysis. Afterwards, the measurement of the indicators of liquidity is discussed. In chapter 4.3, the empirical findings on the indicators of liquidity and the results of five regression models with the indicators of liquidity as the dependent variables are presented. Chapter four ends with a discussion of the empirical results and the hypothesis testing.
Finally, chapter five summarizes the conclusions, points out the limits of this paper and gives an outlook on further research opportunities.
THE GERMAN SHORT TERM MARKETS FOR ELECTRICITY
The day-ahead, intraday and balancing markets form the short term markets for electricity in Germany. 2 In the day-ahead market, energy with physical delivery on the next day "d" is traded anonymously on a trading platform of the European Power Exchange (EPEX Spot) or over the counter (OTC). The ETSO (2007) defines OTC trades as bilateral transactions between two known market participants with the possibility to trade non-standard products. In the day-ahead auction, market participants declare their willingness to sell (offer) or to buy (bid) energy at a certain price for each of the 24 hours of the next day. The day-ahead gate closure is at 12 pm each day. The exchange then sorts all available offers by increasing prices which should reflect the power plants´ marginal costs. This way, the hourly supply or meritorder curve is created. In a similar procedure the demand curve is created by sorting all bids.
In the next step, the hourly day-ahead prices and market clearing volumes are determined by matching forecasted demand and aggregated supply in each delivery hour (Sensfuß et al., 2008) . and Austria is conducted. In this transparent and order driven market, liquidity is being provided by public limit orders and in tight market situations by designated market makers. With a limit order, a market participant may trade a certain amount of electricity at a specified price or better. With a market order, a certain amount of electricity is traded immediately at the best price that is currently available (Jiang et al., 2011) . Intraday trading for the next day starts at three pm and single hour or block contracts can be traded until 45 minutes before physical delivery. Since December 2011 it is also possible to trade quarters of an hour. The exchange price is a publicly available price and functions as the reference price for OTC trades in the GIME. Zachmann (2008) notes that the prices of OTC trades cannot deviate systematically from the exchange prices because traders usually have the option to trade either on the exchange or OTC and will not accept an offer in one market if trading in the other yields a higher profit.
Shortly before delivery, the TSOs take over the responsibility for all remaining imbalances.
To ensure the constant equilibrium between physical demand and supply of the non-storable good electricity at a grid frequency of 50 Hertz in real time, the TSOs make use of pre-contracted balancing services. According to their required activation time and duration of operation, balancing services can be distinguished into primary, secondary and tertiary reserves.
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A balance responsible party's balance group whose net production or consumption deviates from the previously scheduled values will be balanced in real time by the TSO. This way, market participants can close their open positions through the balancing services but will always try to avoid this option for two reasons. Firstly, the market is designed in way that the use of balancing services is always more expensive than self-balancing on the intraday market (BNA, 2012) . Secondly, the TSOs may penalize the occurrence of too many imbalances of one market participant with the abrogation of his balancing contract.
On the weekday after physical delivery (d+1), imbalances within one control zone can be traded ex-post until 4:00 pm on the day-after or yesterday market. Here, market participants announce their imbalances from yesterday on the trading platform IntradayS and try to find another market participant with a symmetrical imbalance profile in the same grid area. According to the first come first serve principle, the mutual imbalances get traded at the dayahead price of the day where the imbalance occurred. Settling imbalances on the day-after market is an ex post financial settlement: physically, a short and a long position of the same size within one grid zone already matched to zero during delivery.
THE CONCEPT OF LIQUIDITY AND ITS DETERMINANTS IN THE GERMAN

INTRADAY MARKET FOR ELECTRICITY
Dimensions of liquidity
From a trader's perspective, liquidity can be defined as the ability to exercise a buy or sell order of any size at any time without the price being influenced by this order (Amihud/ Mendelson, 1991; Liu, 2006; Weber, 2010) . Amihud (2002) and Arnott and Wagner (1990) emphasize that liquidity is not directly observable because its measurement would require data about the difference between the actual execution price of a trade and the market price that would have prevailed in the absence of the transaction. The theoretical literature agrees that liquidity is a multidimensional construct which is not directly observable (e. g. Amihud, 2002; Kyle, 1985; Liu, 2006; Kempf et al., 2009) . Although there is agreement on the multidimensionality of liquidity, disagreement prevails about the dimensions of liquidity, both on the number of dimensions and the actually relevant dimensions. Kyle (1985) identifies three dimensions namely tightness, depth and resiliency. Kempf et al. (2009) agree that liquidity has three dimensions but define them as spread, depth and resiliency. Liu (2006) mentions four dimensions of liquidity that are trading volume, trading costs, trading speed and price impact. Amihud and Mendelson (1991) differentiate between three types of illiquidity costs that are the bid-ask-spread (BAS), market impact costs and delay and search costs. Finally Handa and Schwartz (1996) find empirical evidence that short-run price volatility may be influenced by the liquidity provision in the limit order book.
The first dimension which is described in all four sources is called tightness (Kyle, 1985) , spread (Kempf et al., 2009) , trading costs (Liu, 2005) or BAS (Amihud and Mendelson, 1986) . The quoted BAS is defined as the price difference between the best bid and offer price in the limit order-book. With any traded unit, a market participant bears transaction costs due to the BAS which are as high as the absolute value of the execution price minus the average of the best bid and ask price.
The second dimension of liquidity is resiliency. Kyle (1985) defines market resiliency as the rate at which prices in the limit order book bounce back to the competitive level after an uninformative liquidity shock from a sequence of market orders. Foucault et al. (2005) conclude that a high share of impatient traders in stock markets decreases resiliency because these traders place market orders in order to decrease their waiting time until order execution. Patient traders place new limit orders within the prevailing quotes and make the market resilient.
The third dimension is called price impact (Liu, 2006) , market-impact costs (Amihud and Mendelson, 1991) or market depth (Kyle, 1985) . Amihud and Mendelson (1991) define the price impact from the cost perspective of illiquidity. Illiquidity costs may arise because of an upwards price movement if a good (here electricity) is bought beyond the best ask price or downwards price movement if electricity is sold below the best bid price. The market depth dimension of liquidity is defined as the size of an order flow innovation leading to a change in prices at a given amount (Kyle, 1985) . Both definitions can be understood as the movement along a price-demand function which slope is determined by the volumes and prices of electricity in the limit order book. Amihud (2002) and Weber (2010) notice that the lower the volumes and the larger the price differences between the limit orders, the higher will be the slope of the price-demand function and the price impact of a standardized trade. The price impact of a trade causes transaction costs to rise as the market participant has to pay more when buying or earns less when selling.
In stock markets, short-run price volatility is being considered as another dimension of liquidity. The magnitude of price movements due to information driven trading may be influenced by the amount of liquidity in the limit order book (Handa and Schwartz, 1996) . Furthermore, authors like Ahn et al. (2001) , Engle et al. (2011), or Handa and Schwartz (1996) conclude that in stock markets, short-run volatility may encourage the placement of new limit orders which in turn decrease short-run volatility.
The fifth dimension of liquidity are the delay and search costs which are incurred when a trader delays a trade in order to achieve better prices than those currently quoted or reduce market impact costs (Amihud and Mendelson, 1991 
A fundamental and a trading model of liquidity
In stock markets, liquidity is capped by the quantity of free floating shares. Yet this cap is rather theoretical at least for major titles included in popular indices which typically have a high number of free floating shares. In contrast, the total amount of liquidity available in the GIME might be explained from a fundamental supply curve model (the so called merit-order) and intraday deviations from the day-ahead planning which may be traded in the intraday market.
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The hourly day-ahead price is the market clearing price of a one shot auction for each delivery hour of the day. The exchange aggregates all bids to a demand curve and all offers to a supply or merit-order curve. According to Hirschhausen et al. (2007) the merit-order reflects the marginal costs of all power plants which are offering electricity in the competitive day-ahead market. The day-ahead equilibrium price and market clearing quantity are then calculated by matching the aggregated demand and supply curves ( Figure I top) . The daily base-price is an average price of the 24 hourly equilibrium prices of a day.
Without any information changes between the day-ahead gate closure and the moment of physical delivery, the power plant from the day-ahead auction with marginal costs of P DA ,t * would determine not only the hourly day-ahead price but also the hourly intraday price (figure (2010) emphasizes. Furthermore must run capacities which operate to deliver heat or negative reserve power and power plants which operate to deliver negative balancing service will not be ramped down. Adapting the wording of patient and impatient traders in a limit order market by Foucault et al. (2005) , power plant operators can be described as patient market participants, because they have the option but not the obligation to buy or sell electricity in the intraday market.
Initially, no trading can be observed because the cheapest unused power plant has higher marginal costs than the most expensive operating power plant. Thus, the supply curve lies above the demand curve and no optimization potential exists. In addition to the patient owners of upwards and downwards power plant flexibilities, a second group of intraday market participants with the obligation to trade in the intraday market appears. Unforeseen events after the day-ahead gate closure and before the moment of physical delivery push market participants to balance their portfolios and create additional demand and supply. These market participants can be named impatient traders, because they have a significant financial incentive to balance their portfolios in the intraday market. The current electricity market system is designed in a way that it is always the cheaper option to balance a portfolio on the intraday market than to buy balancing services from the TSO.
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Considering impatient and patient traders as the two main groups of actors in the intraday market, two market models where the market participants behave differently can be formulated. In the first one, the patient traders are power plant owners who trade in an atomistic market structure with perfect competition, zero transaction costs 10 and perfect information availability. The impatient traders are all market participants with intraday imbalances and they are considered to become risk averse. In this setting, patient traders always offer all their available and flexible up-and down-ramping capacities at the power plant specific marginal costs in the limit order book of the intraday market because this strategy ensures profit maximization under the perfect competition assumption. A single power plant owner has no influence on the market price. The intraday demand and supply functions reflect only the fundamentally available power plant capacities. As a consequence of their risk-aversion, impatient traders do not wish to speculate with their intraday trading positions and close them immediately after they appear via sell-or buy-market orders. 11 Only the fundamentally available upward-and downward-ramping capacities provide liquidity in the limit order book in this first model. Therefore, this model is named the fundamental model of liquidity.
In the second market model, the generation side is not perfectly competitive, e. g. with four dominant players and several small power plant owners who form the competitive edge. Significant transaction costs and imperfect information availability make intraday trading more complex and expensive. All market participants strive for profit maximization. The patient traders may offer their available and flexible up-and down-ramping capacities only partly via limit orders and at prices that ensure the coverage of the power plant specific marginal costs plus a profit margin. The dominance of big market participants is even increased by missing intraday office occupation of the small power plant owners and other market participants during weekends, holidays and nighttime. Thus power plant owners may exercise market power and influence the price. Impatient traders are less risk averse than in the fundamental model and try to increase their intraday trading profit and decrease their costs of immediate order execution against patient traders. In this case, impatient traders may enter buy or sell limit orders, thus increasing intraday liquidity provision, or wait until other impatient traders reveal their trading interest first and then execute a market order against them. Bodurtha and Quinn (1990) notice that this trading behavior can be observed in stock markets as well. Since the 10 Transaction costs in the intraday market typically include exchange fees, employment costs of intraday managers and infrastructure costs like information technology development and purchase costs. 11 The risk-averseness causes a utility loss from bearing the risk to hold an intraday trading position that always exceeds the utility gain from uncertain favorable market price development.
trading behavior of all market participants influences the liquidity provision in the limit order book in the second market model, this model will be named the trading model of liquidity.
The following key research question will be analyzed: Does the fundamental or the trading model of liquidity explain the liquidity provision in the GIME adequately? Because this research question is not empirically testable, model hypotheses that are empirically testable are derived in the following paragraphs. Hypotheses that are connected to the fundamental market model are labeled with (a) and hypotheses that are connected to the trading model are labeled with (b).
The dimensions of liquidity that are summarized in chapter 3.1 can be related to the two market models which have been described in the previous paragraph. When the GIME opens at three pm, the hourly bid-ask spread equals the difference between the cheapest flexible unused power plant with marginal costs above the day-ahead price (b t ) and the most expensive and flexible operating power plant with marginal costs below the day-ahead price (a t ).
As soon as impatient traders with portfolio imbalances appear in the market, the BAS is more and more determined by their trading behavior and limit order book dynamics. Under the assumptions of the fundamental market model, the impatient traders will execute their orders immediately and only against patient traders with power plant flexibilities. Thus the BAS may only increase with the total amount of deviations from the day-ahead planning. Under the assumptions of the second market model, impatient traders may try to optimize their execution price and maximize their order execution probability by entering limit orders within the prevailing BAS. Thus the size of the BAS may be negatively correlated with trading activity.
This leads to the following hypotheses:
Hypothesis I a: The size of the BAS is positively correlated with intraday trading activity.
Hypothesis I b: The size of the BAS is negatively correlated with intraday trading activity.
Market resiliency has been defined as the rate at which prices in the limit order book bounce back to the competitive level after an uninformative liquidity shock from a sequence of market orders. Given the traders present in the market and the necessity of physical delivery, the occurrence of uninformed noise trading is rather unlikely in the GIME. 12 Market participants trade only in order to close open positions or to optimize the short term operation of flexible power plants. Under the assumptions of the fundamental market model, a liquidity shock due to intraday information updates is being executed against fundamental power plant capacities in the limit order book. Given the assumption that all power plant flexibilities are incorporated in the limit order book, the prices cannot be resilient because the market liquidity is limited to the quantities available in the limit order book. Under the assumptions of the trading model, the prices may recover after a liquidity shock due to three reasons. Firstly, the remaining impatient traders may adjust their limit order prices to the new price level after a liquidity shock.
Secondly, patient power plant owners who have not offered their power plant capacities previously might find it profitable enough to market the power plants at the new price level.
Thirdly, information updates about deviations from the day-ahead planning appear and may be included by the impatient traders via limit orders into the limit order book as time passes
by. This yields the hypotheses:
Hypothesis II a: The intraday market is not resilient.
Hypothesis II b: The intraday market is resilient.
The price impact and market depth dimensions of liquidity are determined by the slope of the intraday demand and supply curves. Under the assumptions of the fundamental market model, the slopes of both curves depend only on the fundamental demand and supply curves in the intraday market. Power plant owners offer their flexible and available upward-and downward-ramping capacities in the intraday market and all other market participants trade their imbalances as soon as they appear against the power plant owners. During delivery hours where the merit-order shape is inelastic (roughly for a residual demand 13 below 30 Gigawatthours (GWh) and above 60 GWh) 14 the intraday market demand and supply functions may be steep, leading to a low depth and a high price impact of a standardized trade. For a residual demand between approximately 30 and 60 GWh, the merit-order is elastic and has a rather flat slope. During those delivery hours the intraday demand and supply functions may have a flat slope as well and the market depth may be high. In this case, the price impact of a standar-12 Except maybe accidental mistrades which do not occur in significant quantities to be considered. 13 Total demand corrected for imports and exports minus must-run capacities like renewable energy sources and power plants which supply heat. Search and delay costs can be expected to be significant in the intraday market. The fundamental merit-order based liquidity in the intraday market comes along with a comparably large BAS and low market depth, making immediate trading expensive. 15 As time passes by, more and more information about deviations from the day-ahead planning enter the intraday market and may be incorporated into the limit order book, leading to a smaller BAS, a large market depth and comparably flat demand and supply curves. Under the assumptions of the fundamental model, the risk costs to hold a position always outweigh the benefit of a wait and see strategy, even though a market participant may decrease the BAS-and market impactcosts by delaying a trade from the moment when an imbalance occurs until the time shortly (approximately two hours) before delivery. According to the trading model, the market participants are less risk averse and try to maximize their intraday profits through trading strategies.
Thus, they face a trade-off between (1) closing an intraday imbalance immediately at low search and delay costs and comparably high BAS and market impact costs or (2) wait until more information are incorporated in the intraday market and bear the associated search and delay costs. 15 The observed BAS when the GIME opens at three p. m. often amounts to 16-20 euro.
Trading activity is defined as the hourly trading volume and the hourly number of trades.
Without any information changes between the day-ahead gate closure and the hour of delivery, demand and supply would match perfectly according to the day-ahead planning and the intraday trading activity would be zero as no economical reason for intraday adjustments exists. The need for intraday trading arises due to changes of demand or supply of electricity after the day-ahead gate closure. Thus, the trading activity may equal the intraday adjustment needs under the assumptions of both market models. Under the assumptions of the fundamental market model, intraday deviations are being traded as soon as they become apparent for a market participant. Thus, each type of deviation from the day-ahead planning may influence the indicators of liquidity similarly.
Under the assumptions of the trading model, even the impatient traders with portfolio imbalances may behave like patient traders and may decide not to trade imbalances immediately in the GIME. In this case, counteracting imbalances within one portfolio may offset each other, leading to a reduced trading quantity of each impatient market participant and also to reduced market impacts of the intraday deviations from the day-ahead planning. Therefore, the indicators of liquidity may not be influenced equally by each deviation from the day-ahead planning under the assumptions of the trading model.
Hypothesis VI a, b: Intraday trading volume and the number of trades are determined by the intraday deviations from the day-ahead planning.
Hypothesis VII a: All deviations from the day-ahead planning have a similar impact on the indicators of liquidity.
Hypothesis VII b: The various deviations from the day-ahead planning have different impacts on the indicators of liquidity.
Further factors affecting intraday liquidity and trading
The theoretical liquidity provision by patient power plant owners is complemented by the liquidity consumption of impatient traders who trade their intraday deviations from the dayahead planning to correct their schedules. The total intraday adjustment need is the sum of intraday demand and supply due to power plant outages, wind forecast errors, solar power forecast errors, load forecast errors, trading volumes from foreign demand and supply, combined heat and power plant (CHP) optimizations and intraday trading positions. Furthermore, time of the day and day of the week effects may influence liquidity.
Intraday demand may be created by unplanned power plant outages. Electricity from defaulting power plants which was previously sold on long term or day-ahead markets has to be replaced by the seller in order to fulfill his contractual commitments. However shortages due to unplanned outages will only partly lead to purchases on the intraday market. If a power plant defaults before the day-ahead gate closure at 12 am, it's delivery for the next day can be substituted by purchases in the day-ahead market. Thus, the missing electricity production until the end of the day has to be purchased on the intraday market. If a power plant defaults after the day-ahead gate closure, the electricity production for the current and the next day has to be replaced by purchases on the intraday market. From the day after tomorrow on the power plant will be substituted by purchases on the day-ahead market.
Renewable energy sources already account for a substantial part of the German power plant fleet. By the end of 2011 the installed capacity of intermittent RES accumulated to almost 54 GW (Windmonitor, 2012; Bundesverband Solarwirtschaft, 2012) . 16 From January 2010 until December 2011, the four TSOs almost exclusively marketed the expected production from RES (Ullrich, 2009) . Therefore, the production profile from RES for the next day was estimated with forecast models and sold limitless on the day-ahead market. In general, the forecast's preciseness is greater, the closer the forecasted time horizon lies. Hence, the intraday forecast for the production of RES showed deviations from the day-ahead forecasts. The
TSOs may trade the quantity variance in their portfolios resulting from differences between the day-ahead and the comparably smaller intraday forecast error of wind and solar power plants on the intraday market.
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The DENA (2010) and Haubrich (2008) define the load forecast error as the deviation of the per-quarter-hour mean load value from the forecasted load value. Short term load forecasting is performed by all German balance group responsible parties to predict the future level of electricity demand and is important for a proper supply and demand side planning. The deviation of the actually realized load from the day-ahead planned load may be traded in the intraday market. Because there are no grid-wide load forecasts being performed in Germany, figures about the total load forecast errors are difficult to estimate but load forecasts can be ex- 16 The total capacity of installed RES can be divided into wind power (29.012 MW) and solar power (24.800 MW). 17 The forecast error can be measured as the capacity-weighted root mean square error (RMSE) of the wind and solar power production. In the sample period 2010 to 2011 used in this paper RMSE values for wind and PV power of 3.59 % and 2.11 % in 2010 and 3.60 % and 3.02 % in 2011 respectively have been calculated. The RMSE is calculated with respect to the installed capacity and not to the actual power production of the RES. Assuming 1600 full load hours for wind power and 900 full load hours for PV power, the average day-ahead prediction error for wind and PV power is 19.66 % and 20.53 % in 2010 and 19.71 % and 29.39 % in 2011.
pected to be quite precise because the forecasting models can be adjusted on a long data history.
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Germany is well connected to its neighboring countries. The ENTSOE reported net transfer capacity (NTC) of 16585 MW in 2011 for imports into Germany and 15280 MW for exports respectively. According to the ETSO (2007), NTCs which have not been used in day-ahead or long term auctions are freely available for intraday cross border trading. Lehmann et al. (2012) give an overview of the increase of RES in bordering countries like Demark, the Netherlands, France and the Czech Republic in the last years. The increased capacity of installed RES might lead to an increased demand for intraday optimizations and hence raise intraday export and import volumes resulting from foreign RES-E forecast errors. For the case of Denmark Jorgensen and Ropenus (2008) confirm that generation adequacy is ensured in many cases through cross border intraday trading. The French TSO RTE requests balancing services from German counterparts which are then being traded in the GIME. 19 Intuitively, the coupling of electricity markets is expected to foster liquidity pooling and competition as the number of active market participants and fundamentally explainable demand and supply of electricity increases. During the time frame which will be considered here from 2010 to 2011, only French market participants traded directly on the GIME. Hence, only the French trades on the GIME will be considered. ket (exceptions may be severe events like power plant outages) but will be compensated by balancing services.
Day of the week effects may also influence liquidity in the GIME, because small electricity companies may not employ shift teams for intraday trading during the weekend. A lower number of market participants may lead to lower trading activity and less market efficiency 
Construct measurement
The theoretical complexity of the liquidity construct motivated a research stream which focused on the development of methods to accurately measure liquidity over long and short time periods (see Bessembinder and Kaufman, 1997; Corwin and Schultz, 2012; Goyenko et al., 2009; Korajczyk and Sadka, 2008; Marshall et al., 2012) . Those measurement methods cannot be applied with the available data from the intraday market. Resiliency and the price impact cannot be measured because the required order book data is currently not being recorded in the GIME. The measurement of delay and search costs is not feasible because they are determined by the individual decision process of each trader, his deviations from the day-ahead planning and his market analysis. Therefore we subsequently focus on the liquidity indicators shown in Figure II .
The BAS is usually being measured via the effective or quoted spread. The calculation of both measures requires order book data about the prevailing BAS while a trade was executed which is not yet being recorded in the GIME. Instead the BASis calculated with transaction data. All trades in the yearly transaction list are sorted in a chronological row according to their time stamp. Afterwards, the tick test algorithm of Lee and Ready (1991) is employed to define each trade as a "buy" or a "sell". Every time two chronologically subsequent buy and sell trades appear, the difference between both trade prices is calculated and used as one BAS figure. Finally, all spreads for an hour are used to calculate the average BAS of that hour. This procedure shows two weaknesses. The first one stems from the tick test's error rate of 1.2 -47.6 % when classifying a trade as a buy or a sell. The second weakness is the algorithms tendency to underestimate the magnitude of the true BAS.
Price volatility is measured using the high to low difference. The difference between the highest and the lowest trade price for a delivery hour reflects the maximum price spread and thus price variability.
Furthermore price volatility is calculated as the average price variance of all trades for one delivery hour. The index n denotes the single trades for one delivery hour t.
Trading activity is measured via the trading volume in MWh and the number of trades determined as the number of trades per delivery hour. The time of the day-and day of the week-effects are measured with dummy or binary variables. Wooldridge (2011) explains that the difference in the dependent variable (while all other independent variables are fixed) between a specific group and the reference group can be estimated by employing dummy variables. The periods peak (time from eight a. m. to eight p. m.) and Wednesday are taken as the reference groups and thus omitted in the empirical results.
To create a time series for the analysis of the influence of extreme day-ahead prices on the liquidity indicators, the squared difference between the hourly day-ahead price and the average day-ahead price in 2010 and 2011 of 47.81 €/MWh is calculated.
Empirical results
In chapter 3.2 and 3.3, the fundamental merit-order, the trading behavior and intraday devia- Trading Volume in the GIME -with partly diverging effects on the different dimensions of liquidity. In the empirical investigation, the correlations between the dimensions of liquidity as well as the influence of deviations from the day-ahead planning on each dimension of liquidity will be analyzed. In five regression analyses the average BAS, high to low difference, variance, trading volume or the number of trades will be considered as endogenous variables together with the explanatory variables power plant outages, differences between day-ahead and intraday forecasts of renewable energy sources, French trades in the GIME, merit-order shape effects, time of the day and day of the week effects. The bivariate Pearson-correlations between the considered indicators of liquidity are summarized in table II. To control for the influence of the number of actively trading market participants, the correlations were calculated with the residual time series of the indicators of liquidity from the regression analysis. In the regression analysis, the number of actively trading market participants is implicitly controlled for through the time of the day and day of the week dummies, because the number of market participants is lower during the weekend as well as duringoff-peak one and two periods. These results suggest that there are in fact three empirically observable liquidity dimensions, which are rather distinct from one another. The first liquidity dimension is tightness as measured by the BAS. The second observable liquidity dimension is price volatility which is to some extent linked to the first dimension. The third observable dimension, trading activity is however almost independent from the first two dimension. variables have been found and the predictive power of all models goes beyond pure guessing. 21 The subsequent regression analysis also controls for other determinants but the day of the week and time of the day effects. Nevertheless, controlling only for the day of the week and time of the day effects does not change the correlations between the residual time series of the indicators of liquidity. The variance inflation factors (VIF) are between 1.14 and 12.04 but only one VIF exceeds a critical value of 10. Thus, multicollinearity might bias the variances of the slope estimators of the regression models in a few cases. Following the recommendations by Wooldridge (2011), we do not eliminate any variables because the size of the VIF also depends on the total sum of squares which is increased by the sample size of more than 17300 observations in this study. 
AVG BAS
Discussion
The working hypotheses for the fundamental and the trading model of liquidity in the GIME are summarized in tables V and VI.
case during the off-peak one and -two and on Sundays.These empirical findingsstand in contrast to previous results from studies for stock markets. Several authors like Amihud and Mendelson (1986) or Copeland and Galai (1983) During the off-peak one and -two periods, on Sundays and on Mondays, the average BAS, high to low difference and price variance are significantly larger and the trading activity is significantly lower than during the reference groups peak and Wednesday. This stands in contrast to the assumptions of the fundamental model according to which the liquidity provision through power plant owners depends only on the available power plant capacities. After controlling for extreme merit-order shape effects the remaining liquidity indicators should be determined in the same way by the independent variables. The different price reactions during the peak and off-peak periods indicate that trading strategies have a market impact in the GIME. The missing office occupation of small market participants during the off-peak periods and on Sundays reduces the total number of market participants and thus seems to reduce competition. Trading strategies like the retention of capacity or offering available power plant capacities at non-competitive prices aim at the maximization of trading profits and may increase the average BAS, the high to low difference and price variance. These empirical observations indicate that the fundamental model of liquidity does not explain liquidity exhaustively.
The greater the squared difference between the hourly day-ahead equilibrium price and the two years day-ahead average of 47.81 Euro, the significantly higher are the high to low difference and the price variance. A reference value for the impact of merit-order extremes on the volatility indicators under the assumptions of the fundamental or the trading model is missing.
Thus, hypotheses V a and V b are both not falsified. 
